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THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVE: A THEORY
OF JUSTICE FOR THE MENTALLY RETARDED
Eric D. Paulsrud *
I. INTRODUCTION
The mentally retarded' have been present in society as far back
as historical records can be traced. The treatment they have received
has ranged from reverence to indifference to open hostility. The men-
tally retarded did not receive this treatment because of any sadistic or
wantonly malicious attitude present in their community. Their treat-
ment was primarily the result of ignorance: ignorance as to the na-
ture of mental retardation. That ignorance is still present. People
dislike seeing an individual who is different. They avoid the mentally
retarded whenever possible and construct barriers within society that
are almost impossible for the mentally retarded to break down. Re-
cently, however, the courts have tested the validity of these barriers.
* B.A., St. Olaf College, 1982; J.D., Hamline University School of Law, cum laude,
1985. Mr. Paulsrud is currently a judicial law clerk to the Honorable J. Smith Henley, Senior
Circuit Judge, Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
1. Despite the pejorative connotations which have been attached to the term "mental
retardation," see Williams, The Right to Treatment for Developmentally Disabled Persons: Re-
assessment of an Evolving Legal and Scientific Interface, 63 N.D.L. REV. 7, 7 n. 1 (1987), it will
be used throughout this article because of its general recognition by both the public and the
courts. Nevertheless, some minimal explication of the terms used to label this particular group
of persons is in order.
The term "mentally handicapped" includes both the mentally ill and the mentally re-
tarded. The mentally ill are distinguished because their condition is not static, but in flux.
Mental illness can often be totally or significantly cured by treatment or the passage of time.
Mental retardation, however, refers to significantly "subaverage general intellectual function-
ing resulting in or associated with concurrent impairments in adaptive behavior and mani-
fested during the developmental period." Id. at 7 n. 1 (citing AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON
MENTAL DEFICIENCY, CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION 11 (1983)). Thus,
mental retardation is a permanent condition although adaptive behavior can be improved
through treatment.
Some organizations have proposed the term "developmentally disabled" as a substitute
for mentally retarded. Although this terminology has been used in some state statutes, see,
e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-01.2-01(1) (Supp. 1987), it is not widely employed. The World
Health Organization has proposed that mental retardation should be divided into two different
classifications: (1) mentally defective-which would apply to those with subnormal intelli-
gence as a result of biological factors, and (2) mentally retarded-which would refer to those
who were affected by cultural or environmental factors. R. MASLAND, S. SARASON & T.
GLADWIN, MENTAL SUBNORMALITY: BIOLOGICAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND CULTURAL FAC-
TORS 5 (1958).
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The first step in eliminating the obstacles which prevent the mentally
retarded from joining the rest of society is the acknowledgment that
the mentally retarded are citizens and are entitled to full protection of
their constitutional rights. The recognition of the mentally retarded
person's rights under the Constitution then requires that those rights
be protected from encroachment by the states.
When the state does, however, have a compelling and legitimate
interest in infringing on the rights of the mentally retarded, such in-
fringement must occur in the least restrictive alternative. For exam-
ple, if the state can show that it has a legitimate interest in preventing
severely and profoundly2 retarded persons from procreating, it may
2. Mental retardation is broken down into subcategories depending on the individual's
level of intelligence (IQ). The following diagram illustrates the various categories:
ARCHAIC EDUCATIONAL GENERAL
SYSTEM SYSTEM
IQ
--------- 90------------------------------------------
Slow
Learner
------------------------ 75-----------------------------
Moron
Borderline
Educable
------------------------------------ 50-
45
Imbecile
Moderate
Trainable
Severe
------------- -----------25 -- ----------------- -- -------------------
20
Idiot Custodial Profound
--------- 0------------------------------------------
The range given for each particular category is merely an approximation and the boundaries
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enforce some type of preventive measures.3 The state may not segre-
gate the retarded persons from each other when sterilization would
achieve the same result; and the state may not sterilize when birth
control devices could be utilized. If the state chooses to act, and that
action implicates a constitutional right held by the mentally retarded
person, it must act only in the least restrictive manner.
The least restrictive alternative approach requires a two-step
analysis when examining the validity of state action. First, a funda-
mental right must be implicated by the state action. Second, the state
action must be no broader than necessary for achieving a legitimate
goal. The least restrictive alternative analysis is of particular impor-
tance in the area of institutionalization of the mentally retarded, and
that area will form the focus of this article.
Initially, the historical perspective of the treatment of the men-
tally retarded will be outlined to impress upon the reader the past
neglectful treatment the mentally handicapped have suffered; this per-
spective demands a reassessment of society's attitudes toward this
group of persons. From this base, the argument for the least restric-
tive alternative will be analyzed from a constitutional perspective.
II. HISTORY
Early references to the mentally retarded appear in ancient
Greek culture, particularly in Sparta.
The Spar-tans dealt with the severely retarded in the sternest eu-
genic fashion, and obviously defective children are said to have
been cast into the river or left to perish on the mountainside. The
laws of Lycurgus countenanced the deliberate abandonment of "id-
iots," a practice which was probably followed . . . throughout
Greece, and according to Cicero, among the Romans also.4
This is the utilitarian approach articulated by those who are consid-
ered the founders of modern political thought.5
may range by about five IQ points. See Thompson, History of Treatment and Misconceptions
Concerning the Mentally Retarded, in BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION OF THE MENTALLY RE-
TARDED 10 (T. Thompson & J. Grabowski 2d ed. 1977).
3. See infra notes 30 & 31 and accompanying text.
4. S. DAVIES, THE MENTALLY RETARDED IN SOCIETY 8 (1959).
5. Some might argue that Athens and Plato's Socrates are to be more rightly considered
the modern world's intellectual predecessors and not the austere, militaristic Spartans. It
should be noted, however, that in Plato's Republic, Socrates considered Sparta to be the model
of the ideal society. Bloom, Interpretative Essay, in THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 305, 380, 413
(1968). Indeed, Plato's ideal society encompassed an eugenic prediliction. PLATO, THE RE-
PUBLIC 94, 101, 136-39 (A. Bloom trans. 1968). The Supreme Court has found Plato's ideal
4671987-88]
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Throughout the Middle Ages the mentally retarded were some-
times fortunate enough to earn their support as jesters for the nobility.
In other instances they were considered to be demons or les enfants
du bon Dieu-holy infants. 6 "Tycho Brahe had for his close compan-
ion a fool whose mutterings the great astronomer listened as to a reve-
lation." 7 This treatment was the result of ignorance and superstition,
not compassion for the plight of those less fortunate. Society some-
times allowed the individual a modicum of dignity, but more often
than not it inflicted ridicule and scorn. In all cases, society made no
attempt to treat the mentally retarded as individuals with develop-
mental capabilities. The best that could be hoped for was the minimal
care necessary for survival.
Society made little real progress in understanding the mentally
retarded until the beginning of the nineteenth century.8
Before dawn on January 9, 1800, a remarkable creature came
out of the woods near the village of Sain-Sernin in southern
France. No one expected him. No one recognized him. He was
human in bodily form and walked erect. Everything else about
him suggested an animal. He was naked except for the tatters of a
shirt and showed no modesty, no awareness of himself as a human
person related in any way to the people who had captured him. He
could not speak and made only weird, meaningless cries. Though
very short, he appeared to be a boy of about eleven or twelve .... 9
This was the discovery of the Wild Boy of Aveyron. It signaled the
beginning of an educational and medical approach to the care of the
mentally retarded. Initially Dr. Jean Marc Gaspard Itard believed
that the boy was "fundamentally normal and merely uncivilized."'"
Itard attempted through intensive training to bring the boy to the
level of normal functioning. Itard finally conceded his inability to at-
tain his goal, concluding, "[h]is 'intellectual' progress will never
match that of children normally brought up in society." I"
Ironically, Itard won a victory out of his apparent defeat.
Edouard Seguin, Itard's student, believed that Itard had, in fact, im-
properly diagnosed the boy's condition. Seguin believed that Itard
society to be perverse to that created by the Constitution. Bowen v. Gilliard, 107 S. Ct. 3008,
3033 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401-03 (1923).
6. Noone, Mental Retardation, in NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 664 (1967).
7. S. DAVIES, supra note 4, at 9.
8. See Thompson, supra note 2, at 3; Williams, supra note 1, at 8 n.7.
9. R. SHATTUCK, THE FORBIDDEN EXPERIMENT: THE STORY OF THE WILD BOY OF
AVEYRON 5 (1980).
10. S. DAVIES, supra note 4, at 13.
11. R. SHATTUCK, supra note 9, at 159.
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had trained an "idiot" to adapt to society, contrary to Itard's belief
that the boy was not a true "idiot," but only one due to isolation from
society.12 Itard's work with the Wild Boy led Seguin to establish a
school for the mentally retarded employing Itard's methods. These
methods proved effective in helping some mentally retarded individu-
als to adapt to society. Essentially, Itard treated the boy as a human
being capable of development, contrary to all previous thought.
Itard's mistake was in placing the possible level of achievement at that
of a normal individual. In this respect, Seguin was much more realis-
tic in later attempts directed at educating the mentally retarded.
"[T]he Wild Boy achieved greatness in the less recognized form of an
ordinary or even lowly person who responds to exceptional circum-
stances in a way that exceeds our predictions and expectations.
Though handicapped, he outdid himself and reached his limits."' 13
The first institution for the mentally retarded in the United
States was established in 1848,14 two years before Seguin came to
America. The institution, however, was established under the impact
of Seguin's theories in an effort to teach the mentally retarded, not to
serve merely as a custodial facility. In 1854 the first school building
expressly for the education of the mentally retarded was built.
Seguin, in an opening address at the ground laying ceremonies, ex-
pressed a new commitment to a "hitherto neglected" class of soci-
ety-the mentally retarded. 15  Unfortunately this attitude of
compassion would soon change.
All the early schools for the mentally retarded were aimed
largely, if not completely, at "curing" the mentally retarded. 6 It
soon became apparent that this was an unrealistic goal for many; and
in the case of the severely retarded, the individual would never sur-
vive without some societal or, more often, institutional support.
12. Id. at 165.
13. Id. at 183.
14. Thompson, supra note 2, at 4.
15. In his speech Seguin said:
God has scattered among us-rare as the possessors of genius-the idiot, the blind,
the deaf-mute, in order to bind the rich to the needy, the talented to the incapable, all
men to each other, by a tie of indissoluble solidarity. The old bonds are dissolving;
man is already unwilling to continue to contribute money or palaces for the support
of the indolent nobility; but he is every day more ready to build palaces and give
annuities for the indigent or infirm, the chosen friends of our Lord Jesus. See that
cornerstone-the token of a new alliance between humanity and a class hitherto ne-
glected-that, ladies and gentlemen, is your pride; it is the greatest joy of my life; for
I, too, have labored for the poor idiot.
S. DAVIES, supra note 4, at 21.
16. Thompson, supra note 2, at 4-5.
1987-88]
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Although it was not possible to cure the mentally retarded, it was
possible to teach many of them skills within the limits of their intel-
lectual abilities.17 Theoretically, some of these students would return
to society, to some degree self-sufficient."8 The problem was that not
nearly as many could return as active and independent members of
society as was originally hoped. A small percentage could never re-
turn to society and would always rely on the care of institutions or
others. Hence, the schools found themselves in a different position
than that for which they had been established. They were faced with
a dilemma. On the one hand there existed the ever present demand to
admit new wards. Yet on the other hand the parents of those already
at the schools who could not support themselves were unwilling to
resume the burden of their care. Thus, the hope for an educational
facility for the mentally retarded was abandoned, and the institution
as a custodial facility took its place.I9
The training schools (for the short time they did exist as such
before becoming primarily custodial) surprisingly achieved some posi-
tive results. At the time, though, these results were far surpassed by
the schools' conspicuous inability to ever cure a mentally retarded
person. Consequently, the results were not immediately recognized as
a sign of hope, but were ignored because they served to remind the
researchers of how far they had missed their goal. Thus, the idealism
of the first half of the nineteenth century gave way to "the rising tide
of Social Darwinism, the 'science' of eugenics, and ... extreme xeno-
phobia"' which prevailed well into this century.
Dr. Goddard, a director of one facility for the mentally retarded
and a leading medical figure of that day,21 voiced the erroneous fears
of an uninformed population when, after efforts to cure the mentally
retarded failed, he concluded,
[h]ere is a child who has been most carefully guarded. She has
been persistently trained since she was eight years old, and yet
nothing has been accomplished in the direction of higher intelli-
gence or general education....
... The question is, "How do we account for this kind of
17. Id.
18. Eilbracht & Thompson, Behavioral Intervention in a Sheltered Work Activity Setting
for Retarded Adults, in BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED 437 (T.
Thompson & J. Grabowski 2d ed. 1977).
19. Thompson, supra note 2, at 5.
20. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 461-62 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
21. Id. at 462 n.8.
470 [Vol. 10:465
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individual?" The answer is in a word "Heredity,"-bad stock. We
must recognize that the human family shows varying stocks or
strains that are as marked and that breed as true as anything in
plant or animal life.22
This reasoning naturally led Goddard to advocate a treatment of the
mentally retarded which presupposed that such persons were less
than fully human. The mentally retarded were not to enjoy the same
rights and privileges as the rest of the population. This gave birth to
the eugenic alarms of the first half of this century.
"Eugenics (... good birth) is the science and the art of being well
born."23  Goddard and his contemporaries24 firmly believed that
mental retardation resulted almost wholly from heredity. According
to Goddard, "if they were feeble-minded, then no amount of good
environment could have made them anything else than feeble-
minded."2 Both Goddard and Merill attributed sixty-five percent of
mental retardation to heredity and the remaining thirty-five percent to
such causes as injury and disease.26 Further erroneous suppositions
regarding the genetic nature of mental retardation27 led to a general
public fear of the retarded. According to Goddard,
[i]f all of the slum districts of our cities were removed tomorrow
and model tenements built in their places, we would still have
slums in a week's time, because we have these mentally defective
people who can never be taught to live otherwise than as they have
been living....
... They are multiplying at twice the rate of the general pop-
ulation, and not until we recognize this fact, and work on this ba-
sis, will we begin to solve these social problems.2"
Goddard's recommendations for the mentally retarded were not en-
tirely humanitarian. Rather wistfully he remarked that the lethal
22. H. GODDARD, THE KALLIKAK FAMILY 12 (1931) (originally published in 1912).
23. D. JORDAN, THE HEREDITY OF RICHARD ROE, preface (1911).
24. See A. ROGERS & M. MERILL, DWELLERS IN THE VALE OF SIDDEM (1919);
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 462 n.8.
25. H. GODDARD, supra note 22, at 60.
26. A. ROGERS & M. MERILL, supra note 24, at 12-13.
27. Only about fifteen percent of the cases of mental retardation are genetic in nature. R.
MEYERS, LIKE NORMAL PEOPLE 18 (1978). Consequently, two mentally retarded parents will
not necessarily have a mentally retarded child. Therefore, the environmental factors should
not be ignored, as Goddard and others ignored them, when considering the advisability of
mentally retarded parents having children. Clearly, mentally retarded individuals do not pro-
create at a higher rate than the general population. See generally, Williams, supra note 1, at 9-
10 (noting that it is a misconception that the mentally retarded are susceptible to "wanton"
reproduction).
28. H. GODDARD, supra note 22, at 70-71.
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chamber was no longer a possibility; therefore, he advised that "segre-
gation through colonization seems in the present state of our knowl-
edge to be the ideal and perfectly satisfactory method. Sterilization
may be accepted as a makeshift, as a help to solve this problem be-
cause the conditions have become so intolerable. 2
9
Despite the inaccuracy of Goddard's conclusions, 30 states took
his advice seriously. By 1955, twenty-eight states had adopted sterili-
zation laws concerning the mentally retarded,31 and by January, 1955,
29,512 sterilizations had been performed on the mentally retarded.32
There was also a strong surge during this same period toward in-
creased institutionalization (or segregation) of the mentally retarded.
Both of these attempts failed to eliminate mental retardation. They
failed primarily because the majority of the mentally retarded are
born of two nonretarded parents.33 Absent a reversion to the Spartan
concept of genocide or the expenditure of massive sums of money to
warehouse the mentally retarded, society had to accept the mentally
retarded.
After a rather bleak period in American history, the trend of
thought has once more turned to Seguin and the premise that every
individual has inherent worth and capabilities. During the first half of
this century, the Children's Bureau was virtually the only group con-
cerned with the rights and well-being of the mentally retarded. In
1950 a group of concerned parents of mentally retarded children
formed the National Association for Retarded Children (later
renamed the Association for Retarded Citizens (ARC)). This organi-
zation has a powerful influence in the battle for human and legal
rights for the mentally retarded today.
In the 1960s interest mounted in the protection of the mentally
retarded. On October 11, 1961, President John F. Kennedy declared,
29. Id. at 117.
30. See supra note 27.
31. S. DAVIES, supra note 4, at 52-69. The Supreme Court upheld a state sterilization law
in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). A discussion of the mentally retarded's right of procrea-
tion is beyond the scope of this article. See Scott, Sterilization of Mentally Retarded Persons:
Reproductive Rights and Family Privacy, 1986 DUKE L.J. 806; R.K. Sherlock & R.D. Sher-
lock, Sterilizing the Retarded: Constitutional Statutory and Policy Alternatives, 60 N.C.L.
REV. 943 (1982); Starkman, Sterilization of the Mentally Retarded Adult: The Eve Case, 26
McGILL L.J. 931 (1981); Comment, Protection of the Mentally Retarded Individual's Right to
Choose Sterilization: The Effect of the Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard, 12 CAP. U.L.
REV. 413 (1983); Comment, Mental Health Law--Proposed Legislation: Involuntary Steriliza-
tion of the Mentally Incompetent in Illinois, 1983 S. ILL. U.L.J. 227; Comment, Procreation: A
Choice for the Mentally Retarded, 23 WASHBURN L.J. 359 (1984).
32. S. DAVIES, supra note 4, at 52-69.
33. See supra note 27.
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"[w]e must provide for the retarded the same opportunity for full so-
cial development that is the birthright of every American. '3 4 In 1972
a federal court decided Wyatt v. Stickney,35 the first class action
brought against a state institution for the mentally retarded. Finally,
in the 1980s, the United States Supreme Court decided a series of
cases recognizing the constitutional rights of the mentally retarded.3 6
III. THE LAW
A. Constitutional Protection of the Mentally Retarded
Before further discussing the right of mentally retarded persons
to the least restrictive alternative living conditions, it is first necessary
to determine whether the mentally retarded are guaranteed protection
under the language of the Constitution. Sweeping language from the
Declaration of Independence evinces a broad concern for all people.37
Likewise, the preamble to the Constitution provides:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more per-
fect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide
for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure
the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain
and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.3"
The Bill of Rights39 does not speak in specifics but is also broad
enough to cover all people. From this language several writers have
noted that the mentally retarded are not expressly excluded, and
"therefore, the mentally retarded ... are entitled to the full and un-
questionable benefits of their rights and to exercise them the same as
any other individual."' Such legal analysis is not correct and does
34. PRESIDENT'S PANEL ON MENTAL RETARDATION, A PROPOSED PROGRAM FOR NA-
TIONAL ACTION TO COMBAT MENTAL RETARDATION (1962).
35. 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305
(5th Cir. 1974). In Wyatt the court held that civilly committed mentally retarded persons had
a constitutional right to treatment. 503 F.2d at 1313-14.
36. See infra notes 37-179.
37. The preamble to the Declaration of Independence states:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are
Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments
are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the
governed....
The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
38. U.S. CONST. preamble (emphasis added).
39. U.S. CONST. amends. I-X.
40. I. AMARY, THE RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED-DEVELOPMENTALLY DIS-
ABLED TO TREATMENT AND EDUCATION 17 (1980). See also R. SCHEERENBERGER, DEIN-
STITUTIONALIZATION AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORM 65-68 (1976); Dowben, Legal Rights of
1987-88] 473
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not properly locate the source of the mentally retarded's constitu-
tional rights and standing as citizens of the United States.
The Constitution must be analyzed in terms of its historical per-
spective. Applying the analysis outlined above to blacks, a similar
conclusion may be drawn-because the Constitution does not ex-
pressly exclude blacks, they are guaranteed rights under the Constitu-
tion. This is an incorrect conclusion in light of Dred Scott v.
Sandford,4' in which the Supreme Court held that no black, free or
slave, could be a citizen.42 In Dred Scott the court ignored the im-
plicit distinction between "citizen," as used in the body of the Consti-
tution, and "person," which is used throughout the Bill of Rights,
concluding that the two terms were synonymous.43 The Court also
rejected the argument that the language in the Declaration of Inde-
pendence extended to the entire human race. 4 Consequently, it is
uncertain if the Constitution as it existed at the time of Dred Scott
provided protection to the mentally retarded.
On the 28th of July, 1868, the Secretary of State issued a procla-
mation declaring the ratification of the fourteenth amendment.4 5 This
amendment reads in part:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside. No State ... shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.46
The effect of the fourteenth amendment is to overturn Dred Scott and
the Mentally Impaired, 16 Hous. L. REV. 833, 879 (1979); Spece, Preserving the Right to
Treatment: A Critical Assessment and Constructive Development of Constitutional Right to
Treatment Theories, 20 ARIz. L. REV. 1 (1978).
41. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). Dred Scott produced nine separate opinions and en-
compassed over 200 pages in the reporter. For a brief discussion of the case see J. LIEBER-
MAN, THE ENDURING CONSTITUTION 188-93 (1987).
42. 60 U.S. at 454. Actually only three of the justices concluded that a black could not be
a citizen. Zellmer, The Dred Scott Case, 34 ST. Louis B.J. 7, 12 (1987). The basis of the
majority decision was that the Missouri Compromise was unconstitutional, that Scott thus
remained a slave, and that a slave could not be a citizen. Id.
43. 60 U.S. at 404.
44. "The general words.., quoted [the opening paragraphs of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence] would seem to embrace the whole human family, and if they were used in a similar
instrument at this day would be so understood. But it is too clear for dispute, that the enslaved
African race were not intended to be included .. " Id. at 410.
45. Proclamation 13, 15 Stat. 708 (1868). See also U.S.C.S. Constitution, Amend. 14,
p.ll (Law Co-op. 1984).
46. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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its progeny.4 7 Thus, while the chief aim of the amendment "was to
establish the citizenship of the negro,"48 it also extended citizenship to
any person born in the United States.4 9 As a result, mentally retarded
persons born in the United States are citizens of the United States and
entitled to the full protection of their constitutional rights-particu-
larly their right to liberty.
B. The Supreme Court Cases
In the past decade the Supreme Court has decided three cases
interpreting the rights of the mentally retarded under the Constitu-
tion.50 Indeed, the Court had not considered the rights of the men-
tally retarded under the fourteenth amendment prior to these cases.
These cases provide an important backdrop for the remainder of this
article and will be discussed with some detail before elaborating on
the least restrictive alternative analysis as it applies to the mentally
retarded.
1. Youngberg v. Romeo5"
Nicholas Romeo was a thirty-three year old profoundly retarded
person.52 Following his father's death he was committed to the Penn-
hurst State School and Hospital because of his mother's inability to
care for him. 3 While at Pennhurst, Nicholas suffered numerous
physical injuries and was routinely subjected to physical restraints.54
After several objections to Nicholas' treatment, his mother brought
legal action in the United States District Court alleging violations of
Nicholas' eighth and fourteenth amendment rights.55 The jury re-
turned a verdict for the defendant.56 The Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit vacated the district court decision and remanded the
47. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 73 (1872).
48. Id.
49. See Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 328-29 (1939).
50. Another case not discussed in this article is sometimes grouped with the Supreme
Court cases on mental retardation, Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982). Mills deals with the
right to refuse treatment (antipsychotic drugs). See Brant, Pennhurst, Romeo and Rogers:
The Burger Court and Mental Health Law Reform Litigation, 4 J. LEGAL MED. 323 (1983);
Note, Involuntary Commitment and the Right to Refuse Treatment with Anti-psychotic Drugs,
16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 719 (1982-83).
51. 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (Youngberg II).
52. Id. at 309.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 310.
55. Id. at 310-11.
56. Id. at 312.
1987-88]
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case for a new trial.17 The Supreme Court granted the defendant's
petition for a writ of certiorari.18
In Youngberg II the Supreme Court for the first time considered
the substantive rights of involuntarily committed mentally retarded
persons under the fourteenth amendment.59 The Court recognized
that mentally retarded people retain the following liberty interests de-
spite their confinement:
(1) reasonable care and safety;6°
(2) adequate food, shelter, clothing and medical care;6'
(3) minimally adequate training; 62 and
(4) reasonably nonrestrictive confinement conditions.63
The first two rights recognized are perhaps the minimum necessities
for custodial care. The third right, the right to training (or treat-
ment?),' is an area of considerable focus today. Commentators are
chiefly concerned with the proper constitutional foundation and the
extent of this right.65 This article is primarily concerned with the im-
plications of the fourth right-reasonably nonrestrictive confinement
conditions-as it relates to the least restrictive alternative analysis.
57. Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 172 (3d Cir. 1980).
58. Youngberg v. Romeo, 451 U.S. 982 (1981) (Youngberg I).
59. Youngberg II, 457 U.S. at 314.
60. Id. at 324.
61. Id. This was conceded by the state, but the Court emphasized that "[t]hese are the
essentials of the care that the State must provide." Id.
62. "[T]he minimally adequate training required by the Constitution is such training as
may be reasonable in light of respondent's liberty interests in safety and freedom from unrea-
sonable restraints." Id. at 322.
63. Id. at 319. The Court was referring to freedom from physical restraints within the
institution. Id. at 320. Whether this right may extend to a less restrictive confinement (i.e., a
community placement outside the institution) was not before the Court. Romeo's mental de-
velopment most likely dictated that an institutional setting would be the least restrictive alter-
native for him.
64. While the Supreme Court's choice of the word "training" may be significant, many
commentators equate this with the right to treatment. See infra note 65.
65. See Brant, supra note 50; Cook, The Substantive Due Process Rights of Mentally Dis-
abled Clients, 7 MENTAL DIs. L. REV. 346 (1983); Rubin, Generalizing the Trial Model of
Procedural Due Process: A New Basisfor the Right to Treatment, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
61 (1982); Note, Youngberg v. Romeo: The Right to Treatment Dilemma and the Mentally
Retarded, 47 ALB. L. REV. 179 (1982); Note, Beyond Youngberg: Protecting the Fundamental
Rights of the Mentally Retarded, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 1064 (1983); Note, Youngberg v.
Romeo: Moving Toward a Constitutional Right to Habilitation for the Mentally Retarded, 62
N.C.L. REV. 162 (1983); Note, Constitutional Law-Mental Health Law-Right to Treat-
ment-Youngberg v. Romeo, 29 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 513 (1984); Comment, Constitutional
Rights of the Involuntarily Committed Mentally Retarded After Youngberg v. Romeo, 14 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 1113 (1983); Note, Constitutional Law-the Rights of Involuntarily Committed
Mentally Retarded Persons Under the Fourteenth Amendment-Youngberg v. Romeo, 31 U.
KAN. L. REV. 451 (1983).
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2. Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman 66
This class action suit was originally brought in 1974 by Terri Lee
Halderman, a resident at Pennhurst, alleging that the conditions at
Pennhurst violated the class members' eighth 67 and fourteenth
amendment rights, and various state and federal statutes. 6  The dis-
trict court found in favor of the plaintiffs on constitutional as well as
federal and state statutory grounds.69 On appeal, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision solely on federal statutory
grounds.70 The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' decision
and remanded the case for a determination of whether the decision
could be supported on the basis of state law, the Constitution, or
other federal statutory grounds.7' On remand, the court of appeals
affirmed its prior decision based on a state statutory provision. 72 The
Supreme Court again granted certiorari to determine whether the
court of appeals' decision was prohibited by the eleventh
amendment.73
Previously, in order to avoid the problems of haling a state into
federal court, plaintiffs would name officers of the state as defendants
rather than the state itself.74 The Supreme Court rejected this tactic
in Pennhurst II, concluding that whenever the state was "'the real,
66. 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, modified and remanded
in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc), rev'd and remanded, 451 U.S. 1 (1981)
(Pennhurst I), reaff'd on remand, 673 F.2d 647 (3d Cir. 1982) (en banc), rev'd and remanded,
465 U.S. 89 (1984) (Pennhurst II).
67. The eighth amendment reads: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. In
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) the Supreme Court determined that the eighth
amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment was limited to persons who had
been formally adjudicated of a crime. Id. at 671-72 n.40; see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520
(1979).
68. Pennhurst II, 465 U.S. at 92; The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-96
(1976 & Supp. III); The Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 6001-81 (1976 & Supp. III); The Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retarda-
tion Act of 1966, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4101-704 (Purdon 1969 & Supp. 1983-84).
69. Pennhurst II, 465 U.S. at 92-93; Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446
F. Supp. 1295, 1314-26 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
70. Pennhurst II, 465 U.S. at 93-94; Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612
F.2d 82, 95-100, 104-07 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc).
71. Pennhurst II, 465 U.S. at 95; Pennhurst I, 451 U.S. at 27-31.
72. Pennhurst 11, 465 U.S. at 95-96.
73. Pennhurst I, 451 U.S. at 31. The eleventh amendment provides: "The Judicial power
of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced
or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
74. See Pagan, Eleventh Amendment Analysis, 39 ARK. L. REV. 447, 462-63 (1986).
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substantial party in interest,' "7 the eleventh amendment bars the
suit, "regardless of whether it seeks damages or injunctive relief."'76
The important exception to this rule is when the suit challenges the
constitutionality of a state's action. 77 The Supreme Court further de-
termined that the eleventh amendment would also bar pendent claims
brought against the state. 78 Thus, a federal court may not grant relief
based on any pendent claim and must not consider those claims in
reaching a decision. The court may, however, consider the underly-
ing constitutional claim on which the pendent jurisdiction was
hung.
It is appropriate to discuss the significance of the Pennhurst HI
decision at this point because its importance is limited to statutory
interpretation and the viability of state law claims in federal court.
Consequently, Pennhurst H is distinct from the development of the
least restrictive alternative analysis, but it does impact on claims that
can be asserted in a suit challenging the conditions of confinement
and the forum in which these suits may be brought.
Numerous states, in light of recent action taken by the federal
courts focusing public attention on the plight of the mentally re-
tarded, enacted statutes which codify the rights of institutionalized
mentally retarded persons. ° Many of these statutes provide that the
75. Pennhurst H1, 465 U.S. at 101 (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of
Ind., 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945)).
76. Pennhurst 11, 465 U.S. 102.
77. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Under the Young exception a state official's
unconstitutional action constitutes state action under the fourteenth amendment, but not
under the eleventh amendment. Florida Dep't. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670
(1982).
78. Pennhurst H1, 465 U.S. at 121.
79. Id. at 125.
80. The following is a list of the states and their respective statutes dealing with the men-
tally retarded. If an asterisk (*) appears before the state, it indicates that the statute explicitly
provides for the least restrictive alternative. If a statute appears without an asterisk, the state
has provided some substantive rights but not necessarily the least restrictive alternative. If no
citation appears after a state name, that state has not provided any statutory codification of
substantive rights. Those states may, however, have commitment statutes for institutionalizing
the mentally retarded.
Alabama
Alaska ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.655(2) (1985)
* Arizona ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-551.01 (1986)
Arkansas
* California CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 4502 (West 1984)
* Colorado COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-10.5-101(b) (Supp. 1986)
Connecticut CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-206a to -206k (West Supp. 1987)
* Delaware DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5161 (1983)
* D.C. D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-1962, -1963 (1981)
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institutionalization must be the least restrictive alternative., Thus,
the focus of judicial action is likely to shift from the federal to the
state courts82 because of Pennhurst's eleventh amendment restriction
on pendent claims based on a state statute.
Additionally, on the first appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court
* Florida
* Georgia
* Hawaii
* Idaho
* Illinois
Indiana
* Iowa
Kansas
* Kentucky
* Louisiana
Maine
* Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
* Minnesota
Mississippi
* Missouri
* Montana
Nebraska
* Nevada
* New Hampshire
* New Jersey
* New Mexico
New York
* North Carolina
* North Dakota
* Ohio
* Oklahoma
* Oregon
* Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
* South Carolina
* South Dakota
* Tennessee
* Texas
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 393.065(2)(c) (West 1986)
GA. CODE ANN. § 37-4-121, -122 (1982)
HAW. REV. STAT. § 333-43.5 (1985)
IDAHO CODE § 66-412(3)(b) (Supp. 1987)
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91/2, § 2-102(a) (Smith-Hurd 1987)
IND. CODE ANN. § 16-14-1.6-2, .6-3 (West 1985)
IOWA CODE ANN. § 225C.28(6) (West Supp. 1987)
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-2927 to -2930 (1983)
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202B.060(12) (Baldwin 1982)
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:390 B.(1) (West Supp. 1987)
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B, § 5605 (Supp. 1986)
MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 7-1002(b)(2) (Supp. 1987)
MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 104, §§ 20.01, 22.01, 23.01 (1980)
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 330.1704-.1754 (West 1980)
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.09 subd. 1 (West Supp. 1988)
MIss. CODE ANN. § 41-21-102(6) (Supp. 1987)
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 630.115(10) (Vernon Supp. 1988)
MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-20-101 (1985)
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 83-1,141 to -1,146, 83-1101 to -1139 (1981)
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 433.494(1), 435.128(l)(c) (1985)
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126-A: 39 (Supp. 1987)
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-24.2(e)(2) (West 1981)
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 43-1-6 to -1-9 (1986)
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 13.01 (McKinney 1978)
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-51 (1986)
N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-01.2-02 (Supp. 1987)
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5123.171 (Page Supp. 1986)
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 4-102 (West Supp. 1988)
OR. REV. STAT. § 427.031(3) (1985)
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7102 (Purdon Supp. 1987)
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-1-10 (1984)
S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-21-20 (Law. Co-op. 1985)
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 27B-8-14 (1984)
TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-5-201 (1984)
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. § 5547-300 (C)(7), (D)(15) (Vernon
Supp. 1988)
Utah
* Vermont VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 8824, 8828 (Supp. 1986)
* Virginia VA. CODE ANN. §§ 37.1-65.1(C3), -84.1(6) (1984)
Washington WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.30.030 (West 1987)
West Virginia -
* Wisconsin WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.61(1)(e) (West Supp. 1987)
* Wyoming WYO. STAT. § 25-5-115(a)(iii) (1986).
81. See supra note 80.
82. A survey of the annotations to the statutes listed in note 80 discloses virtually no cases
decided on state statutory grounds.
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rejected the plaintiff's claim based on federal statutory grounds.83
The plaintiff relied on the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and
Bill of Rights Act, 4 which provides in part:
Congress makes the following findings respecting the rights of per-
sons with developmental disabilities [(mental retardation)]:
(1) Persons with developmental disabilities have a right to ap-
propriate treatment, services, and habilitation for such disabilities.
(2) The treatment, services, and habilitation for a person with
developmental disabilities should be designed to maximize the de-
velopmental potential of the person and should be provided in the
setting that is least restrictive of the person's personal liberty.8 5
The Supreme Court determined that in enacting the legislation, Con-
gress had not intended to secure the guarantees of the fourteenth
amendment.8 6 The Court concluded that the statute was a "mere"
federal-state funding statute which expressed statements of federal
policy, but that section 6010 did not establish any new rights.87 Fi-
nally the Court said that the federal funds were not conditioned on a
state's compliance with section 6010 because such conditioning was
not explicit in that section of the act as it was elsewhere in the Act. 8
The courts have been reluctant to extend the rights of the men-
tally retarded unless the statutory grounds for doing so are explicit
and do not create constitutional jurisdiction problems. Such reluc-
tance, however, does not foreclose an inquiry into the purely constitu-
tional basis for the least restrictive alternative. Indeed, the language
of section 6010 suggests that such a basis exists.8 9 Following an in-
83. Pennhurst , 451 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1981).
84. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6081 (1976 & Supp. III).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 6010(1), (2) (1978) (emphasis added) omitted and reenacted at 42 U.S.C.
§ 6009 (Supp. III 1985).
86. Pennhurst l, 451 U.S. at 16-18.
87. Id. at 18-27. "[T]he provisions of § 6010 were intended to be hortatory, not
mandatory." Id. at 24.
88. Id. at 23-27. The Supreme Court's decision in Pennhurst I reducing § 6010's bill of
rights to mere precatory language has been the subject of considerable commentary. See
Brown, Pennhurst as a Source of Defenses for State and Local Governments, 31 CATH. U.L.
REV. 449 (1982); Boyd, The Aftermath of the DD Act: Is There Life After Pennhurst? 4
UALR L.J. 448 (1981); Note, Mental Health Law-42 USC. § 6010 Held Not to Create Sub-
stantive Rights in Favor of Mentally Retarded, 65 MARQ. L. REV. 156 (1981); Note, Pennhurst
State School & Hospital v. Halderman: Back to the Drawing Board for the Developmentally
Disabled, 60 N.C.L. REV. 1115 (1982); Note, The "Bill of Rights" of the Developmentally
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act Did Not Create Substantive Rights for the Mentally
Retarded to Appropriate Treatment in the Least Restrictive Environment, 58 N.D.L. REV. 119
(1982); Note, Pennhurst v. Halderman: A Bill of Rights in Name Only, 13 U. TOL. L. REV.
214 (1981).
89. "The standards set were considered the 'absolute minimum' so as not to 'violate the
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quiry into the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement involving
the mentally retarded, the constitutional source for a right to the least
restrictive alternative will be examined.
3. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center9°
In 1980 the Cleburne Living Center (CLC)9' attempted to obtain
a special use permit to allow it to operate a group home for the men-
tally retarded in a residential neighborhood. 92 The city's zoning ordi-
nance prohibited the establishment of" '[h]ospitals ... or homes...
for the ... feeble minded'" without such a permit. 93 The city council
denied the permit application.94 After exhausting its available admin-
istrative remedies, CLC brought suit against the city in the United
States District Court.9 Following a bench trial, the district court en-
tered judgment in favor of the city.96 CLC appealed.
On appeal, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit concluded that the mentally retarded were a quasi-sus-
pect class and it applied heightened scrutiny97 to invalidate the ordi-
nance requiring a special use permit on equal protection grounds.98
The full court, with six judges dissenting, denied a hearing en banc. 99
The Supreme Court granted certiorari" and affirmed in part and va-
cated in part the panel decision.101
Constitutional rights of the individuals in those programs.' " Boyd, supra note 88, at 459 n.92
(quoting S. REP. No. 160, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1975)).
90. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
91. For ease of discussion, CLC will refer to all of the plaintiffs.
92. Cleburne Living Center v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191, 193-94 (5th Cir. 1984),
aff'd in part and vacated in part, 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 194. The reasons given for the denial were as follows:
1. the attitude of the majority of owners of property located within two hundred
(200) feet of [the proposed group home] .. .;
2. the location of a junior high school across the street ...
3. concern for the fears of elderly residents of the neighborhood;
4. the size of the home and the number of people to be housed;
5. concern over the legal responsibility of CLC for any actions which the mentally
retarded residents might take;
6. the home's location on a five hundred (500) year flood plain; and
7. in general, the presentation made before the City Council.
Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 197.
98. Id. at 202.
99. Cleburne Living Center v. City of Cleburne, 735 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1984).
100. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 469 U.S. 1016 (1984).
101. 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1984).
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The Supreme Court vacated the portion of the panel's decision
holding that the mentally retarded are a quasi-suspect class. 10 2 In ad-
dressing equal protection challenges to statutes, the Supreme Court
applies a three-tiered system of review. 03 The Court determines first
which level of judicial review to apply (strict scrutiny, somewhat
heightened review, or rational basis test) depending on the group of
people or the interest that is involved.'" Strict scrutiny I°5 is reserved
for "classifications that disadvantage a 'suspect class,'10 6 or that im-
pinge upon a 'fundamental right.' 1107 Heightened review, sometimes
referred to as intermediate scrutiny, 0 8 is employed when the "legisla-
tive classification, while not facially invidious, nonetheless give[s] rise
to recurring constitutional difficulties." °109 This intermediate level of
review is applied when the class affected is a quasi-suspect class. 10
Only gender"'. and illegitimacy" 2 have been found by the Supreme
Court to be quasi-suspect classes." 3 If the classification does not war-
rant either of these higher levels of review, the legislative action is
102. Id. at 446.
103. Comment, Equal Protection and the Mentally Retarded: A Denial of Quasi-Suspect
Status in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 72 IOWA L. REV. 241, 243 (1986).
104. Id. at 243-44; Note, Zoning Ordinance for the Mentally Retarded Fails the Rational
Basis Test, 8 UALR L.J. 721, 725 (1985-86); see Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-20 (1982).
105. The strict scrutiny test requires "the State to demonstrate that its classification has
been precisely tailored to serve a compelling government interest." Plyer, 457 U.S. at 217.
106. The Supreme Court has recognized three suspect classifications: McLaughlin v. Flor-
ida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (race); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 646 (1948) (national
origin); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (alienage).
107. Plyer, 457 U.S. at 216-17.
108. In order to pass muster under heightened review, "the classification [must reflect] a
reasoned judgment consistent with the ideal of equal protection by inquiring whether it may
fairly be viewed as furthering a substantial interest of the State." Id. at 217-18; see Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
109. Plyer, 457 U.S. at 217.
110. A quasi-suspect class is one which shares some, but not all, of the characteristics
which make a class suspect. See L. TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1090 (1978).
The indicia of a suspect class are several: (1) membership in the class must be immutable,
Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351 (1979), Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686
(1973); (2) whether the class is a "discrete and insular minority," United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938); (3) whether the class has been "subjected to . . . a
history of purposeful unequal treatment," San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 28 (1973); and (4) whether the class has been "relegated to ... a position of political
powerlessness." Id. Contra City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 445
(1985).
111. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
112. Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99 (1982).
113. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (refusing to
extend heightened review to differential treatment based on age).
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reviewed for mere rationality.114 In Cleburne the Supreme Court con-
cluded that the mentally retarded were not a quasi-suspect class,
115
but nonetheless overturned the zoning ordinance as being based on
"irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded."'' 16
Cleburne evinces a determination by the Supreme Court to avoid
a mechanical formulation of what constitutes a quasi-suspect class." 7
When the particular immutable characteristic which defines the mi-
nority group is one which the legislature may reasonably take into
account, the Court will not presume discriminatory intent. 1 8 Essen-
tially, the Court seems to find a qualitative difference between those
attributes distinguishing already suspect and quasi-suspect classes'
and the attribute distinguishing the class in Cleburne-mental retar-
dation. " '[C]lassifications based on physical disability and intelli-
gence are typically accepted as legitimate, even by judges and
commentators who assert that immutability is relevant. The explana-
tion, when one is given, is that those characteristics (unlike the one the
commentator is trying to render suspect) are often relevant to legiti-
mate purposes.' "120
Commentary on Cleburne and its unusually stringent application
of the rational basis test is legion.' 2 ' The Court's decision, while not
explicitly granting the mentally retarded greater protection from leg-
islative action, should give state legislators pause when they consider
the enactment of legislation which may disadvantage the mentally re-
tarded. As Justice Marshall points out in his dissent, the majority did
114. Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) ("[W]e thus seek only the assurance that the
classification bears some fair relationship to a legitimate public purpose.").
115. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446.
116. Id. at 450.
117. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 103, at 247-53 (arguing that an application of the four
indicia of suspectness, see supra note 110, requires a finding that the mentally retarded are a
quasi-suspect class).
118. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446.
119. See supra notes 106, 111, 112 and accompanying text.
120. Cleburne, 473 U.S. 442-43 n.10 (quoting J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 150
(1980) (footnote omitted)).
121. See Mason, Rights of the Mentally Disabled, 1986 ANN. SUR. OF AM. L. 195; Minow,
When Difference Has Its Home. Group Homes for the Mentally Retarded, Equal Protection
and Legal Treatment of Difference, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 111 (1987); Note, The City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center and the Supreme Court: Two Minorities Move Toward
Acceptance, 63 DEN. U.L. REV. 697 (1986); Note, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
Inc.: Judicial Step or Stumble? 6 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 409 (1986); Note, Equal Protection and
the New Rational Basis Test: The Mentally Retarded are not Second Class Citizens in Cleburne,
13 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 333 (1986); Note, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center: Ra-
tional Basis with a Bite? 20 U.S.F.L. REV. 927 (1986); Note, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center: Denial of Quasi-Suspect Status for the Mentally Retarded and its Effect on
Exclusionary Zoning of Group Homes, 17 U. TOL. L. REV. 1041 (1986).
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not apply the traditional rational basis test in invalidating the ordi-
nance; rather it engaged in somewhat heightened scrutiny or "second
order" rational basis review. 122 The Court has taken a tentative step
toward protecting these historically disadvantaged people by requir-
ing that a statute discriminating against them actually be rational.
Cleburne makes clear that any right the mentally retarded may have
to the least restrictive alternative placement must be posited on a fun-
damental constitutional right, and not on any greater solicitude based
on their class characteristic.
C. The Least Restrictive Alternative
The Supreme Court has recognized that the mentally retarded
have a fourteenth amendment liberty interest in reasonably nonre-
strictive confinement conditions within an institution.' 2  The argu-
ment advanced here is that this liberty interest is a fundamental
right-a right to be free from confinement. Any state encroachment
on the mentally retarded person's liberty interest must, therefore, oc-
cur in the least restrictive alternative. Consequently, any institution-
alized mentally retarded person who is capable of living outside the
institution in an intermediate level of confinement must be so placed.
Before discussing the constitutional analysis buttressing this position,
several cases rejecting such a position will be discussed.
1. The Youngberg II Standard
In Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo 124 the
Second Circuit reversed a district court finding that residents of a
state institution were entitled to the least restrictive environment,
which, in some cases, mandated community placement rather than
continued institutionalization. 25 The appellate court, basing its deci-
sion solely on constitutional grounds in light of Pennhurst 11, 126 con-
cluded that the proper standard of review, after Youngberg II, was
"whether a particular decision has substantially met professionally ac-
cepted minimum standards."'' 27 Thus, "constitutional standards are
met when the professional who made a decision exercised 'profes-
122. Cleburne, 437 U.S. at 458 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See Mason, supra note 121, at
200-01; Note, supra note 104, at 733-34.
123. See supra notes 50-65 and accompanying text.
124. 737 F.2d 1239 (2d Cir. 1984). See also Note, The Right to Treatment: Society for
Good Will to Retarded Children, Inc. v. Cuomo, 80 Nw. U.L. REV. 1355 (1986).
125. Society for Good Will, 737 F.2d at 1248.
126. See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
127. Society for Good Will, 737 F.2d at 1248.
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sional judgment' at the time the decision was made."'' 28 Applying this
interpretation of Youngberg II, the Second Circuit concluded:
Even if every expert testifying at trial agrees that another type of
treatment or residence setting might be better, the federal courts
may only decide whether the treatment or residence setting that
actually was selected was a "substantial departure" from prevailing
standards of practice.
Therefore, we may not look to whether the trial testimony es-
tablished the superiority of a "least restrictive environment" in
general or of community placement in particular. Instead, we may
rule only on whether a decision to keep residents at [the institu-
tion] is a rational decision based on professional judgment.' 29
The Fifth 3 ° and Seventh' Circuits have reached similar results.
The court's decision in Society for Good Will is erroneous because
it incorrectly applies the standard articulated in Youngberg H. The
Youngberg H standard is not the proper standard for determining
whether the mentally retarded have an entitlement to a least restric-
tive environment under the Constitution. The Youngberg I court
adopted the standard enunciated by Chief Judge Seitz in his concur-
ring opinion for the court of appeals.' 32 This standard was not devel-
oped to determine whether the mentally retarded had a right to the
least restrictive alternative when their liberty interest is infringed by
the state, but rather it was utilized to determine whether the defend-
ant was liable in a section 1983133 civil rights action.13 4 This conclu-
sion is supported by the Supreme Court's language in Youngberg H
that liability may be imposed only when the mentally retarded are
confined contrary to a rational decision based on professional judg-
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1248-49 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
130. Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 807 F.2d 1243, 1249-51 (5th Cir. 1987).
131. Phillips v. Thompson, 715 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1983). See also Rennie v. Klein, 720
F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983) (in which the court abandoned the least intrusive means test in evalu-
ating a mental patient's right to refuse treatment).
132. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982) (quoting Romeo v. Youngberg, 644
F.2d 147, 178 (Seitz, C.J., concurring)) (Youngberg H).
133. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress." Id.
134. See Romeo, 644 F.2d at 154 (standard of proof required for § 1983 suit for damages).
"[Olur duty in this case is only to establish minimum constitutional standards to govern the
individual claims of a Pennhurst resident against certain Pennhurst officials." Id. at 181 (Seitz,
C.J., concurring).
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ment. "' The least restrictive alternative analysis provides an appro-
priate framework for answering the question of whether to place the
mentally retarded. The professional judgment standard, on the other
hand, is appropriate for determining whether state officials are liable
under section 1983 for failing to place the mentally retarded individ-
ual in the least restrictive environment. At least one court has recog-
nized this distinction between the Youngberg II standard and the least
restrictive alternative approach.
Youngberg v. Romeo involved only a claim for money damages for
past infringements .... The Court's decision does not inform at
all as to the appropriate reach of injunctive relief for the protection
of liberty interests established by state law, and the holding is not
necessarily dispositive of the scope of prospective relief for the pro-
tection of the fourteenth amendment liberty interests which it rec-
ognized. Obviously the problem of hindsight interference with
decisions made by hard-pressed professional staff members of state
mental institutions is a more serious one than that of assisting them
in directing prospective injunctive relief against appropriate state
officials. 136
The mentally retarded have a constitutionally derived right to the
least restrictive alternative, although this right may not give rise to a
civil action under section 1983 for past infringement. 137 The inability
to maintain a civil action under section 1983 for damages arising out
of a past infringement of a constitutional right does not foreclose an
action based strictly on the fourteenth amendment for injunctive relief
to prevent continuing infringement of the mentally retarded person's
liberty. 1 38
135. Youngberg 11, 457 U.S. at 323.
136. Scott v. Plante, 691 F.2d 634, 637 (3d Cir. 1982). Scott involved a mentally ill person
committed to a state psychiatric hospital.
137. Cf Popow v. City of Margate, 476 F. Supp. 1237 (D.N.J. 1979). In Popow the plain-
tiff's decedent was deprived of his fourteenth amendment right to life, id. at 1242, but an
action would only lie under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the defendant's action was at a level of culpa-
bility exceeding simple negligence. 476 F. Supp. at 1242. By analogy, an institutionalized
mentally retarded individual may be deprived of his fourteenth amendment right to liberty.
However, an action for damages could only be brought if the state's action in institutionalizing
him exceeded simple negligence. Thus, the Supreme Court in Youngberg was developing a
standard by which the defendant's conduct could be measured to determine if it exceeded the
level of culpability necessary for the recovery of damages under § 1983.
138. Scott, 691 F.2d at 637. In fashioning a remedy for a constitutional violation, the court
must "tailor 'the scope of the remedy' to fit 'the nature and extent of the constitutional viola-
tion.' " Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 293-94 (1976) (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S.
717, 744 (1974)). An action for damages may be more intrusive on state sovereignty and the
principle of comity counsels a higher standard for the award of such a remedy. Injunctive
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2 Liberty Interest of the Mentally Retarded
The least restrictive alternative is not a constitutional right in
and of itself. In order to trigger the least restrictive alternative analy-
sis, some fundamental right within the Constitution must be impli-
cated. 3 9 A person's liberty interest as found in the fourteenth
amendment is such a right.' 4°
Inherent in the fourteenth amendment is a right to be free from
confinement.14 No right is more vital to one's personhood. Conse-
quently, the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment man-
dates elaborate safeguards before that right can be overborne. If
proper due process constraints are followed, however, the right to be
free from confinement can be extinguished.142 In a criminal situation
"a conviction curtails a defendant's right to freedom from confine-
ment, but it does not extinguish this liberty interest completely."' 43
Similarly, although a mentally retarded person has been committed
under proper procedures, he still retains a substantive liberty interest
under the fourteenth amendment.' 44 Therefore, even following a
valid 145 confinement in an institution, the mentally retarded individ-
ual still retains a liberty interest. It should be emphasized that the
mentally retarded person's liberty interest is much greater than that
of the convicted criminal. The criminal is incarcerated and his liberty
significantly curtailed as punishment itself (although there are also
other penological objectives). The mentally retarded person, how-
ever, is placed in an institution to provide for his care, not to punish
him for his diminished mental capacity. Accordingly, the mentally
retarded individual's retained liberty interest is much greater than
that of the prisoner and the state must act responsively to maximize
his liberty. Having established that the mentally retarded possess a
fundamental constitutional right to their continued liberty, it is neces-
sary to consider in what manner and to what extent a state may
abridge this right.
relief against future constitutional violations, however, provides the state room in which to act
to conform its conduct to the constraints of the federal Constitution.
139. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
140. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 312 (1980).
141. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979).
142. Id. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493 (1980).
143. United States v. Schell, 692 F.2d 672, 681 (10th Cir. 1982) (McKay, J., concurring
and dissenting in part). See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976).
144. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315 (1982) (Youngberg II).
145. Throughout this article it is assumed that the institutionalization procedure itself con-
forms to the due process requirements of the fourteenth amendment.
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3. The Least Restrictive Alternative
The Supreme Court first recognized the least restrictive alterna-
tive analysis in Shelton v. Tucker. 46
In a series of decisions this Court has held that, even though
the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that pur-
pose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental
personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.
The breadth of legislative abridgement must be viewed in the light
of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.' 4 7
In applying the least restrictive alternative analysis several factors de-
serve consideration. First, one must consider whether the state action
impinges upon a fundamental constitutional right. "Only where state
action impinges on the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights
or liberties must it be found to have chosen the least restrictive alter-
native." 148 As has been discussed, the action of placing a person in an
institution intrudes on his fundamental liberty interest.149  Confine-
ment may also infringe upon other fundamental rights."15
The second element is whether the state has a "legitimate and
substantial" purpose to impinge upon the constitutional right. 5'
Three reasons have been advanced for the institutionalization of the
mentally retarded: (1) protection of others, (2) protection of the men-
tally retarded person, and (3) the mentally retarded person's need for
treatment or habilitation.' 52 Any or all of these reasons may be legiti-
mate reasons for the state to take action. Because there have been no
serious challenges to the state's power to institutionalize the mentally
146. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
147. Id. at 488 (footnotes omitted). In Shelton the court was faced with an Arkansas stat-
ute that required school teachers to annually file an affidavit listing every organization to
which they belonged or contributed to in the preceeding five years. The court stated that there
was no dispute that this statute impaired the teachers' right to freedom of association. Id. at
485-86.
148. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 51 (1973).
149. See supra notes 139-45 and accompanying text.
150. For example: (1) freedom of association, NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 466
(1958); (2) right to travel, Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); (3) right to privacy, Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), freedom of choice in marital relations, Boddie v. Connect-
icut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); (4) control over one's appear-
ance, Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970);
(5) locomotion, Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958), William v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270 (1900);
and (6) freedom from excrement and urine while confined, LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d
974 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878 (1973), Flakes v. Percy, 511 F. Supp. 1325 (W.D.
Wis. 1981).
151. Shelton, 364 U.S. at 488.
152. Dowben, Legal Rights of the Mentally Impaired, 16 Hous. L. REv. 833, 837 (1979).
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retarded when they are unable to survive on their own, it will be as-
sumed that these are legitimate reasons for state action. Thus, the
pivotal issue posed is whether the state action in achieving legitimate
goals is consistent with the principle of the least restrictive alternative.
In Covington v. Harris53 the District of Columbia Circuit con-
sidered the least restrictive alternative as it relates to civil
commitment.
[T]he principle of the least restrictive alternative consistent with
the legitimate purposes of a commitment inheres in the very nature
of civil commitment, which entails an extraordinary deprivation of
liberty justifiable only when the respondent is "mentally ill to the
extent that he is likely to injure himself or other persons if allowed
to remain at liberty." A statute sanctioning such a drastic curtail-
ment of the rights of citizens must be narrowly, even grudgingly,
construed in order to avoid deprivations of liberty without due pro-
cess of law. 154
The least restrictive alternative approach was later applied to the con-
finement of the mentally retarded. In Welsch v. Likins I" the district
court concluded that the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment imposed
a constitutional duty on the part of State officials to explore and
provide the least stringent practicable alternatives to confinement
of noncriminals. As applied to involuntary civil commitment these
options [range] from placement of the committed person in the
custody of a friend or relative to disposition within a private
facility ....
... The due process clause does no more than require that
State officials charged with obligations for the care and custody of
civilly committed persons make good faith attempts to place such
persons in settings that will be suitable and appropriate to their
mental and physical conditions while least restrictive of their
liberties. '56
Numerous federal district courts follow this approach when determin-
ing the scope of a least restrictive alternative in confinement. 15 7 Diffi-
culties arise, however, in determining the requirements imposed on
153. 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
154. Id. at 623 (footnoted omitted).
155. 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974), aff'd in part and vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977) (the Eighth Circuit only vacated the district court's
order enjoining the enforcement of state constitutional and fiscal control provisions).
156. 373 F. Supp. at 502.
157. Johnson v. Solomon, 484 F. Supp. 278, 297-311 (D. Md. 1979); Gary W. v. Louisiana,
437 F. Supp. 1209, 1216-22 (E.D. La. 1976); Eubanks v. Clark, 434 F. Supp. 1022, 1027-28
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the states by the least restrictive alternative analysis, and how such a
requirement should be enforced by the courts.
4. Applying the Least Restrictive Alternative
The courts lack a uniform interpretation of what the least restric-
tive alternative entails.
Not only do courts differ with respect to the characterization
of the least restrictive alternative requirement, they also do not
share a uniform view of what such a requirement entails. One
court has written in terms of subjective "good faith attempts" to
place persons in appropriate settings. Another court has described
a duty to "explore and provide ... practicable alternatives to con-
finement." Still another court has asked whether a mode of treat-
ment is "overly restrictive of liberty on a comparative basis."
Finally, a more recent statement of the requirement, which takes
into account a deference toward medical judgments in individual
cases, probes into "which of two or more major treatment ap-
proaches is to be adopted" in regard to "initial environmental dis-
position, not to ongoing therapeutic regimens or medical
prescriptions."' 1
58
"As a general matter, a State is under no constitutional duty to pro-
vide substantive services for those within its border."' 59 The state's
first alternative, then, is to close its institutions and turn out those
residents currently therein. As Laurence Tribe concludes:
[I]f the state and federal governments were to wash their hands
altogether of the sick, hungry, and poor, none of the interstitial
doctrines sketched here could provide a remedy. But that is simply
a reminder of the basic point suggested as long ago as 1827 by
Chief Justice Marshall-that a government which wholly failed to
discharge its duty to protect its citizens would be answerable pri-
marily in the streets and at the polling booth, and only secondarily
if at all in the courts. To say this is not to deny that government
has affirmative duties to its citizens arising out of the basic necessi-
ties of bodily survival, but only to deny that all such duties are
perfectly enforceable in the courts of law.'6
The states, however, have shouldered the burden of providing services
(E.D. Pa. 1977); Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439, 452-53 (S.D. Iowa 1976); Lynch v.
Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 392 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
158. Philipp v. Carey, 517 F. Supp. 513, 518 (N.D.N.Y. 1981) (citations omitted).
159. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982) (Youngberg II).
160. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-9, at 920-21 (1978) (footnotes
omitted).
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to the mentally retarded and are not likely to suddenly abandon that
responsibility.
Having chosen to provide services, the state is obligated to obey
the mandates of the Constitution. Thus, for the mentally retarded
person facing possible institutionalization, the state must provide the
least restrictive alternative. Having chosen (or having been compelled
by the court) to comply with this requirement, the state must address
two further issues: (1) whether the least restrictive alternative re-
quires the least restrictive alternative available or the least restrictive
alternative possible, and (2) determine who is to make the decision
concerning possible alternatives.
Requiring the state to provide no more than the least restrictive
alternative available virtually emasculates the concept of the least re-
strictive alternative. The state might do no more than conform its
present institutions to the minimal standards set out in Youngberg
11161 and make no effort to further reduce the restraint that institu-
tional living places on the mentally retarded. On the other hand, to
require the state to seek the least restrictive alternative possible would
place an extreme financial burden on the state, often with little corre-
sponding gain in liberty for the mentally retarded individual. Under
the second alternative, the state would have to immediately make
available and maintain a continuum of alternatives, including:
(1) remaining in the natural home, or with a relative or inlaw,
(2) foster homes,
(3) group homes,
(4) residential treatment centers,
(5) private treatment centers,
(6) semi-public or public treatment centers, [or]
(7) restrictive centers. 162
In Johnson v. Solomon 163 the court recognized the wide divergence
between alternatives available and alternatives possible. The court de-
termined that the state, while not required to make available the full
panoply of alternatives, should commit itself to a policy of deinstitu-
tionalization.1 64 The court recognized that numerous practical and
financial considerations constrained the state and that every individ-
ual could not immediately receive the benefit of a least restrictive al-
ternative. Thus the state, when considering institutionalization of a
161. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
162. Johnson, 484 F. Supp. at 304.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 305.
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mentally retarded person, should first determine whether institution-
alization is the least restrictive alternative for that person. 65 If insti-
tutionalization is not the least restrictive alternative, the state should
examine if there is a less restrictive alternative currently available.
1 66
If no such alternative is presently available the person may be institu-
tionalized, but the state has an affirmative duty to seek out other alter-
natives and to establish such alternatives.
The state, having assumed the burden of providing care for the
mentally retarded, must provide such care within the strictures of the
Constitution, thus requiring creation of less restrictive alternatives to
institutionalization. However, the state has numerous other obliga-
tions and would prefer to minimize its financial burden by maintain-
ing the present status quo of institutions. Changing from the current
centralized institutional system to a broader based support program
for the mentally retarded which would provide less restrictive alterna-
tives will probably result in some short-term duplication of services
and a significant increase in cost. The long-term effect, however, may
very well result in a financial savings for the state. As has been ob-
served, "institutions [are] the most expensive, community homes less
expensive, foster homes even less expensive, and family homes least
expensive."' ' 6  Thus, even from a purely financial standpoint, the
state should seek to establish and maintain least restrictive
alternatives.
Although the state is obligated to provide some services, it is not
required to provide the best possible treatment and conditions without
regard to cost. "Due process . . . does not guarantee the [mentally
retarded] the right to be treated in the least restrictive environment
that money can buy." 168 The limitations and practical considerations
faced by the states must be recognized by the courts.
165. See Kentucky Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. Conn, 674 F.2d 582, 585 (6th Cir.
1982) ("The least restrictive alternative for some severely and profoundly retarded persons
may be institutionalization."), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1041 (1982).
166. Johnson, 484 F. Supp. at 305; Stammus, 414 F. Supp. at 453. In Welsch the court
declared that if the state "chooses to operate hospitals for the mentally retarded, the operation
must meet minimal constitutional standards, and that obligation may not be permitted to yield
to financial considerations." 500 F.2d at 1132. The court, however, was speaking of condi-
tions within the institution. Thus, if a state chooses to maintain an institution it must meet the
constitutional standards of Youngberg II without regard to cost. In meeting the constitutional
standard of the least restrictive alternative, however, the state may receive more deference in
light of the barriers it faces, so long as it makes some progress toward providing alternative
services.
167. Association for Retarded Citizens of North Dakota v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473, 483
(D.N.D. 1982), aff'd, 713 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1983).
168. Johnson v. Brelje, 701 F.2d 1201, 1210 (7th Cir. 1983).
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[The mentally retarded do not have] a right to the best treatment
available, any more than the right to counsel means the right to the
nation's foremost trial lawyer. Logic, economics, and the scarcity
of human resources make it impossible to supply the finest to
everyone. Nor are courts, or child rehabilitation experts, however
skilled, equipped to determine infallibly what is optimum.' 69
Accordingly, the courts are likely to give states considerable deference
with regard to the planning and implementation of their institutional
systems. Likewise, the courts will not require that each mentally re-
tarded person be given the full panoply of procedural protections
given to a criminal defendant before institutionalization.
[T]he imperative that least drastic means be considered does not
imply a constitutional right on the part of every individual to a
personal judicial determination that the means being employed to
improve his condition are the best possible or the least restrictive
conceivable. What is required is that the state give thoughtful con-
sideration to the needs of the individual, treating him construc-
tively and in accordance with his own situation, rather than
automatically placing in institutions, perhaps far from home and
perhaps forever, all for whom families cannot care and all who are
rejected by family or society.17 °
When the state fails to give consideration to the individual and fails to
offer legitimate alternatives to restrictive institutional settings, the fed-
eral courts may take action at the behest of the individual.
When the state has violated a constitutional principle, the federal
courts have the power to order the state to take action to remedy the
constitutional violation and to require the state to fund the necessary
action. 7 1 The court's decision, however, will finally rest on a balanc-
ing of competing interests.
Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its content can-
not be determined by reference to any code. The best that can be
said is that through the course of this Court's decisions it has rep-
resented the balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of
respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between that
liberty and the demands of organized society. 12
Thus, the decision of the court will of necessity be highly fact-oriented
169. Johnson, 484 F. Supp. at 302; Gary W. v. Louisiana, 437 F. Supp. 1209, 1217-18 (E.D.
La. 1976).
170. Gary W., 437 F. Supp. at 1217.
171. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280-81, 289 (1977).
172. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting) reh'g denied, 368 U.S. 869
(1961).
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and turn on the practicability of alternatives and the needs of society
as a whole. Choosing a standard of practicability in requiring the
state to seek out less restrictive alternatives for the placement of the
mentally retarded is an accommodation of both the state's and the
mentally retarded person's interests. In determining what choices a
state should make available it is well to remember that the mentally
retarded are not demanding a perfect environment, that they "do not
seek to guarantee that all patients will receive all the treatment they
need or that may be appropriate to them. They seek only to ensure
that conditions in the state institutions will be such that the patients
confined there will have a chance to receive adequate treatment." '
The state is obligated to inquire into less restrictive alternatives.
The standard for such an inquiry, however, and who should make the
ultimate decision, are not yet settled. The Youngberg II decision en-
courages the courts to show considerable deference to the judgment of
a qualified professional."7 4 Following Youngberg II the courts have
been divided as to precisely how that decision affects the least restric-
tive alternative analysis. In Society for Good Will to Retarded Chil-
dren the court denied the right to community placement (a less
restrictive alternative) so long as the decision to continue institution-
alization was a "rational decision based on professional judgment."7 5
Consequently, when the experts from the two sides disagree, the state
prevails. Such an approach misconstrues Youngberg II.
The Youngberg H decision only requires that deference be given
to professional judgment, not that the courts abrogate their role in
protecting a citizen's rights. The issue of least restrictive alternatives,
as it applies to the mentally retarded, is not purely a question of law
or medical judgment-it is a combination of the two.'76 The courts
are entrusted with the obligation to preserve the delicate balance be-
tween the two concerns. To totally divorce themselves from the deci-
sion, as the Society For Good Will to Retarded Children court did,
places too much discretion in the hands of professionals hired by the
state. While these professionals presumably act in the best interest of
the mentally retarded, such a presumption should not be absolute.
173. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1316 (5th Cir. 1974).
174. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322 (1982) (Youngberg II).
175. Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239, 1249 (1984);
see also Phillips v. Thompson, 715 F.2d 365, 368 (7th Cir. 1983) ("[I]t must be determined
whether professional judgment in fact was exercised in balancing the liberty interest of the
class members against relevant State interests.").
176. Note, Youngberg v. Romeo: The Right to Treatment Dilemma and the Mentally Re-
tarded, 47 ALB. L. REV. 179, 201-10 (1982).
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Likewise, the Youngberg court correctly recognized that the courts
should exercise appropriate restraint when dealing with placement de-
cisions of state professionals. In applying this balancing approach,
one court concluded that "a constitutional right to the least restrictive
method of care or treatment exists only insofar as professional judg-
ment determines that such alternatives would measurably enhance the
resident's enjoyment of basic liberty interests."1 77 Thus, while the
court will give deference to state professionals, such deference would
include weighing the opinion of a nonstate professional advocating a
less restrictive placement. Indeed, the right to a least restrictive envi-
ronment for the mentally retarded has been accepted as professionally
required.78 The importance of an entitlement to the least restrictive
alternative for the mentally retarded, in human terms, is aptly put in
the following lines from a district court opinion:
Some residents ... are unduly physically restrained by living
in the [institution]. They are capable of much freer and more pro-
ductive activities in small group community based homes. For
these individuals, the Constitution mandates placement in a group
home, or in some other situation in the community, where they can
effectively exercise their proven ability to live independently. As
[one] resident ... so poignantly put it:
I have been living in institutions, various institutions, for most
of my life and I would like to go and see what it's like to live
at somebody's house and be, like you know, once in a while, to
get that kind of love that other kids get.179
IV. CONCLUSION
For many years institutionalization served as a form of forced
isolation to remove the mentally retarded from society's view. Ameri-
can culture failed to accept the mentally retarded as equal members in
society. Although the societal and legal values of the culture have
prevented the wholesale extermination of the mentally retarded, the
alternative was a not-so-benign neglect. The institutions into which
they were placed became warehouses for unfit human beings, not be-
cause the mentally retarded were unable to learn and take part in
society, but because society was unwilling to accept persons who
could not meet its standard of normality.
177. Association of Retarded Citizens of North Dakota v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473, 486
(D.N.D. 1982).
178. Society for Good Will, 572 F. Supp. at 1347.
179. Id. at 1346-47.
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Recently, however, concerned individuals and organizations
have given the mentally retarded a voice. People have been forced to
consider the plight of the mentally retarded in relation to the constitu-
tional principles upon which our nation was founded. The federal
courts have recognized that the mentally retarded have an interest in
maintaining their liberty. Because a person's liberty interest is a fun-
damental right guaranteed under the Constitution, state infringement
on that liberty must be for a compelling reason and then only in the
least restrictive alternative.
The state may no longer simply place the mentally retarded in an
institution. The state is obligated to consider the mentally retarded as
individuals and give deference to their needs. If the mentally retarded
person can benefit from a less restrictive form of institutionalization,
the state must inquire into the availability of such an alternative. If
no such alternative exists, or no spaces are available in existing facili-
ties, the state has not yet discharged its constitutional obligations.
The state must seek to establish practicable alternatives to the institu-
tionalization of the mentally retarded.
It is time that society accepted all members of the human race as
equal partners, not simply those who are intellectually and cosmeti-
cally pleasing. A fundamental aspect of being human is interacting
with the rest of society, not just those with similar attributes. The
human race is a diverse one and that diversity is to be valued. Provid-
ing the mentally retarded with less restrictive community placements
provides them the opportunity to interact with and become contribut-
ing members of society. By denying the mentally retarded person that
opportunity, not only are the mentally retarded denied their place in
society, but society also denies a portion of itself.
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